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The Gulf of Finland (GOF) is recognized as one of the most transited
maritime areas in the world (Kuronen et al., 2009; Lappalainen et al.,
2014; Lehikoinen et al., 2015). In this area, ship traffic has gradually in-
creased due to the transport of several goods to Finland and Russia and
the increment of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) production and ex-
port from Russia (Brunila and Storgård, 2012; Kujala et al., 2009). This
trend is also found during wintertime when the GOF is partially or
completely covered by ice (Finnish Transport Agency, Liikennevirasto,
2014a). The navigational operations of vessels in ice conditions differ
significantly from those performed in open water (Finnish Transport
Safety Agency, Trafi, 2011). This creates the need for different ap-
proaches to analyse the risk of accidents whichmay lead to catastrophic
consequences for people and the natural environment (Afenyo et al.,
2015).
The analysis of the risk associated with different maritime opera-
tions and its effect on different environmental contexts has been previ-
ously carried out (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2014, 2015a; Hänninen
and Kujala, 2012; Lee and Jung, 2015; Montewka et al., 2011; Mullai
and Paulsson, 2011; Oltedal and Wadsworth, 2010; Qu et al., 2011;ez Banda).
. This is an open access article underSingh et al., 2015; Sormunen et al., 2014; Ståhlberg et al., 2013; Zhang
et al., 2015).Moreover, accidental risk in theGOF and the risk of oil spills
and their possible devastating consequences in this area has also been
previously studied (Kujala et al., 2009; Leiger et al., 2009; Lehikoinen
et al., 2015, 2013; Montewka, 2009). However, these studies
have been limited to navigational operations in open water, spring–
summer–autumn season.
An initial analysis of the risk associated to the navigational opera-
tions performed in sea ice conditions is presented in (Valdez Banda
et al., 2015a). The study describes particular types of accidents and haz-
ards ofwinter navigation. This analysis included a description of the sys-
tem implemented to manage the operations of vessels during winter,
and a description of the particular accidental scenarios and their occur-
rence frequencies. This and other previous analyses (Jalonen et al.,
2005; Riska et al., 2007), represent important and necessary informa-
tion describing the operative performance of ships in a context where
limited research has been performed. Notably, these studies have par-
ticularly detected the operation types which would benefit most from
further risk management developments. However, applicable actions
and recommendations for improving winter navigation operations are
still lacking.
Riskmanagement aims to develop a coordinated set of activities and
methods used to direct an operation and to control the safety system
and the risks that can affect the operation performance and the ability
to successfully reach its objective (International Organization forthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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should be linked to the identification and strengthening of the condi-
tions which represent the basis for the successful performance of an op-
eration (Dekker, 2014; Hollnagel, 2014).
Hence, this study presents a model for assessing the risk of winter
navigation operations performed in the GOF, extending earlier work
to winter conditions. The model describes and assesses the main op-
erations performed by the vessels navigating in this area during win-
tertime, analyses the risk of ship collisions in the contexts of the
mentioned operations, assesses the related oil spill risks, and pro-
poses risk control options for the execution of winter navigation
operations.
2. Methodology and data
The methodology utilized for the analysis is based on the structure
proposed in the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) by the International
MaritimeOrganization (IMO). FSA is defined as a rational and systemat-
ic process for assessing the risks associated with shipping activity and
for evaluating the costs and benefits of IMO's options for reducing
these risks (International Maritime Organization, IMO, 2005). Original-
ly, FSA represented a tool for supporting the evaluation of new regula-
tions and compare proposed changes with existing standards (Ruud
andMikkelsen, 2008). Today, FSA is utilized to perform a balanced anal-
ysis between various technical and operational issues including the
human element, and between safety and costs.
This study adopts FSA as a process for structuring a riskmanagement
modelwhich serves as a tool for exploring the safety performance of the
most common winter navigation operations of ships navigating in the
ice covered waters of the GOF. Thus, the model represents an instru-
ment for further reflection on the performance of the stakeholders in-
volved in the execution of these operations.
FSA consist of six steps, which are taken as a basis for defining the
risk management model structure. Table 1 presents these six steps as
part of themethodology for developing themodel, aswell as the results
obtained after execution of each step.
2.1. System description (Step 0)
A clear understanding of the components and context of the system
and their relation to accidents is essential for defining the model scope
and for identifying themain factors influencing the performance ofwin-
ter navigation operations.
2.1.1. Ice conditions
In theGOF, the first sea ice cover appears in the eastern part (Russian
coastal areas) and it gradually extendswestwards. The type of ice expe-
rienced everywinter in this area includes different forms of floating and
fasted ice, starting from the formation of new ice and ending with the
most extreme formations of consolidated packed ice. Ice ridges and
very thick ice levels can be also experienced in this area, representing
the main challenges to the execution of the ship traffic operations. TheTable 1
The six steps of the FSA used as a basis to define the model structure.
FSA step Task
Methodology and data (Section 2)
0 System description
1 Hazard identification
2 Risk analysis
3 Risk control options
Results (Section 3)
4 Improve–benefit analysis
5 Recommendationsformation of different types of ice in the GOF depends on the severity
of the winter experienced, mild winters (e.g. winter 2014–2015) with
few spots of light ice conditions, and/or severe winters (e.g. winter
2003–2004)with a total ice coveredGOF. Amore elaborated description
of ice types and ice formation in the GOF is presented in Riska et al.
(2007).2.1.2. Winter navigation operations
Winter navigation operations are categorized in two general types:
ship independent navigation and icebreaker assistance operations.
Ship independent navigation is described as the navigational operation
that begins when a merchant vessel enters areas covered with sea ice
and navigates in them without in site assistance of any other type of
vessel. Icebreaker assistance includes four main operation types:
escorting, a single ship, leading convoy of several ships, cutting loose
when a vessel got stuck in ice, and towing a ship (Rosenblad, 2007).2.1.3. The Finnish–Swedish winter navigation system (FSWNS)
The FSWNS guides and rules the navigational operations performed
by ships every winter at the Baltic Sea, including operations performed
in the GOF (Riska et al., 2007). The FSWNS aims at ensuring the safety of
the vessels and crewnavigating in ice conditions and protecting the nat-
ural environment (Finnish Transport Agency, Liikennevirasto, 2014b).
The system is ruled by ice class regulations which define the technical
requirements for the vessels attempting to navigate in ice conditions.
This is complemented with additional requirements for cargo handling
and with the meteorological and ice information received from ice ser-
vices. Based on this information, traffic restrictions are settled in differ-
ent zones of the Baltic Sea. The restrictions aim at supporting ship traffic
flow and better coordination of icebreaker assistance. The complete de-
scription of the FSWNS is presented in Finnish Transport Safety Agency
(Trafi) (2010).2.1.4. Input from the human performance
The input from thehumanperformance in this study is limited to the
interaction among the crew performing operations on the ship's bridge
during the execution of the four described operations. The analysis of
the human performance assesses several common performance condi-
tions for performing the tasks included within the execution of the op-
erations. An extended description of the implemented method for this
analysis is presented in Section 2.3.6.2.2. Hazard identification (step 1)
In previous studies, extreme ice conditions and the expertise of the
people performing winter navigation operations have been pointed as
the main challenging factors for ensuring the safety of navigation in
ice conditions (Valdez Banda et al., 2015a,b). These studies present de-
tailed information given by the accidents commonly reported in the
GOF, the ice condition in which these accidents occurred, and detailed
description of hazardous scenarios based on accidental data and expert
consultation. This section summarizes the findings of these studies and
posteriorly adopts these into the structure of the proposed model.2.2.1. Accident types
The most common accident occurring during winter navigation op-
erations is collision, includingmainly ship-to-ship collision, ship-to-ice-
breaker collision and few cases of icebreaker-to-ship collision. This
accident accounts for almost 50% of the accidents occurred in ship inde-
pendent navigation and around 95% of the accidents occurred in ice-
breaker assistance operations. The second most common accident is
propeller damage, which is mainly reported by ship independent
navigation.
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Consolidated icewith an ice thickness between 15 and 40 cmare the
conditions inwhichmost of the accidents are reported. Ice ridges repre-
sent another common factor reported in the accidents. Experts inwinter
navigation have ranked these conditions together with poor visibility
and extreme temperatures and weather conditions (winter storms,
strong winds, icing on board, etc.) as the main conditions challenging
the performance of ships.2.2.3. Identification of hazardous scenarios
Based on accident data and expert opinions, hazardous scenarios can
be portrayed. For example, accident data presents that the navigation of
several general cargo vessels in consolidated ice with an ice thickness
between 15 and 40 cm represent a higher risk of collision. Moreover,
when general cargo vessels navigate independently in an ice channel,
manoeuvres such as passing, crossing and encountering represent an-
other hazardous scenario which may lead to collision.
In icebreaker operations, assisting several vessels in an ice chan-
nel with extreme ice conditions, low temperatures, ice thickness
between 30 and 60 cm and consolidated ice with ridges represent
one of the most complicate scenarios. For example, complex situa-
tions where the assisted vessels formed in the convoy need to keep
a high speed and close distance in order to avoid getting stuck in
ice, hence, increasing the risk of collisions with more severe
consequences.
Moreover, expert consultation has also identified hazardous scenar-
ios such as the manoeuvring of a ship in a limited space area (e.g. in an
ice channel). This is a hazardous scenario because the ice conditions in
the edges of the channel may cause an involuntary bouncing of the ves-
sel back to the channel and provoking a collision when e.g. passing an-
other vessel. A detailed list of hazardous scenarios can be found in
Valdez Banda et al. (2014).Fig. 1. A flowchart presenting the description of the components under analysis within the risk
describes a given component is provided.2.3. Risk analysis: risk management model constitution (step 2)
The understanding of the theoretical foundation and functionality of
the model is essential for its proper employment. Therefore, it is funda-
mental to understand the risk perspective adopted in the analysis, also
to clearly identify the components included within the model, and to
understand their actual function. Fig. 1 presents the general description
of the different components included in the risk management model of
winter navigation.
2.3.1. Risk perspective and model use
The understanding of risk and the corresponding risk perspective is
essential for the elaboration of a risk analysis. In this study, risk assess-
ment is defined as the systematic consideration of the uncertainties
(U) regarding the occurrence of events (A) and their consequences
(C), in light of available background knowledge (BK) (Aven, 2010a).
This represents adopting a constructivist basis for risk analysis, based
on the integration of available data from accident reports, ice and traffic
conditions registered every winter in the GOF, and the interpretation of
expert views and risk assessors about common operational characteris-
tics and the influence of the human element on the performance of op-
erations, by using different available evidence (Goerlandt and
Montewka, 2015b). In line with this perspective, the systematic ap-
proach to measure and describe risk in this study is:
R  A;C;UjBKð Þ: ð1Þ
The framework aiming at risk analysis, which is presented in this ar-
ticle, is developed bymeans of Bayesian Networks (BNs). BNs represent
a modelling technique that can depict relatively complex dependencies
and cope with uncertainty while also having a graphical dimension
(Pearl, 2014). Thus, BNs enable reflection of the available knowledgemanagementmodel of winter navigation. At each variable the reference to a sectionwhich
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sive way (Montewka et al., 2014).
A fundamental issue is to clearly define how the risk analysis is
meant to be applied in decisionmaking. Commonly, risk analysis frame-
works developed by using BNs are aimed to be a tool for calculating
probabilities, which are assessed with risk acceptability criteria or
used in optimization procedures for making the decision in an almost
automatic way (Aven, 2010b). Literature presenting these types of ap-
proach for analysing the risk of oil spills in open sea context can be
found in e.g. (Lehikoinen et al., 2013; Klanac and Varsta, 2011).
The framework proposed in this article does not focus on the proba-
bilities to determine if the risk is acceptable or unacceptable. The objec-
tive is rather to support the transmission of the evidence to the available
information integrated into the model and to identify the risks of colli-
sion and accidental oils spills. Thus, the model conveys an argumenta-
tion based on available evidence, provides a basis for communication
among the stakeholders of the operations and it serves as an aid to
thinking. These functionality characteristics are common in non-
predictive models (Hodges, 1991). The purpose of thesemodels is to al-
leviate the argument rendered by the risk quantification utilizing the
model, and provide transparency about the analysed risk and its evi-
dence,which represent essential aspects of risk-informed decisionmak-
ing (Aven, 2011; Watson, 1994).
The main challenge for frameworks of this type is the limited time
for decision makers to implement and review the total function of a
framework constructed under these characteristics. Thus, the intended
users of the model proposed here are panel expert-reviewers, such as
the FSA Expert Group in IMO decision making (Psaraftis, 2012). More-
over, the model can also be utilized by the actual decision makers in
the execution of the operations (safety managers in shipping compa-
nies, icebreaker operators, and maritime safety controllers and authori-
ties), who are the ones with commonly restricted time-schedule and
also are inexperienced in the utilization of this type of tools.2.3.2. Accidental and expert data
The analysis of accidental data reported in Finnishmaritime areas in
four winter periods is utilized as one of the main references to deter-
mine the probability of collision in each operation. This data is strength-
ened with an assessment made by experts about the potential severity
of collision in different operations. The initial determined probability
is obtained by comparing the number of collisions reported and the
total number of port arrival and departures in ports of Finland during
the four analysed winter periods, this for the analysis of ship indepen-
dent navigation. For collisions in icebreaker assistance operations, the
comparison between the number of collisions reported and the number
of assistance operations performed by icebreakers during three winter
periods is performed. The complete description of this information is
presented in Valdez Banda et al. (2015a). Table 2 summarize the prob-
ability of collision obtained for each type of operation and the severity
level registered in accident reports and the severity level assessed by
experts.Table 2
The probability and severity level of collisions in winter navigation operations (adapted
from Valdez Banda et al., 2015a).
Winter navigation operation Probability of collision Severity levela
Reported Assessed
Ship independent navigation 1.5E−04 LS; S LS; S; VS
Icebreaker assistance operations
Convoy 1.4E−04 LS; S LS; S; VS
Towing 3.7E−04 LS LS
Cutting loose 4.6E−05 LS LS; S
a Severity levels: less serious (LS), serious (S), very serious (VS).The values presented in Table 2 are considered in order to posterior-
ly create the calculation of the probability of collision in the model pro-
posed in this study (see Section 2.3.7.).
2.3.3. Analysis of ice conditions for determining the exposure to collision
The classification of the ice conditions and determination of expo-
sure to collision in this section is determined by combining the ice con-
ditions existing every winter in the GOF and an assessment made by
experts to determine the risk of performing operations under these con-
ditions. The utilized group of experts to create the exposure to collision
based on ice conditions included:
• Two icebreaker captains from Finland; each of them with more than
15 years of practical experience in the performance of ship navigation
in ice condition;
• Two Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operators from Finland; one with
about 10 years of practical experience and the other with 7 years
of practical experience in the monitoring of winter navigation
operations;
• One pilot also from Finland; he has more than 15 years of experience
in the provision of pilotage services during wintertime.
For this classification, the experts received three different groups of
ice conditions describing the main elements included in traditional ice
charts (see Finnish Meteorological Institute, FMI, 2014). Thus, the first
group called ice conditions A include the main type of ice covers regis-
tered in the Gulf of Finland, the second group called ice conditions B in-
clude extra conditions which can be additional to the ice conditions A,
and finally a third group called ice thickness categorizing 3 scales of
ice thickness. This categorization has previously been utilized in the
analysis of ship accidents during wintertime (see Valdez Banda et al.,
2015a). Finally, the experts are asked to group the conditions and ice
thickness into three levels (High–Average–Low)which describe the ex-
posure to collision in the context of the development of the four
analysed operations. Table 3 presents exposure to collision resulted
from the most common combinations assessed by the experts.
2.3.4. Traffic conditions during wintertime in the GOF
Ship traffic conditions during wintertime are limited by the traffic
restrictions established in every port located in the Northern Baltic.
The GOF has different ice conditions depending on the winter severity,
this restricts the navigation of the vessels belonging to certain ice
class. In general, the most common type of vessel navigating the GOF
during winter time is general cargo, this is followed by oil, chemical
and LNG tankers.
In order to accurately estimate the probabilities of the type of vessels
navigating in the GOF during wintertime, the analysis of Automatic
Identification System (AIS) data has been elaborated. The selected
data for this analysis includes the registered vessels navigating in the
GOF in two particular months, March 2011 (in a winter considered as
a severe one) and January 2012 (a winter considered as an average
one). Based on this data, general cargo vessels account for about 56%
of the total vessels reported, tankers represent about 26%, Roll On–Roll
Off passenger (Ro-Pax) vessels are about 6%, and other types represent
the remaining 12%. This evidence also demonstrates that traffic trends
remain similar either in severe winters or average winters. Appendix
A presents detailed statistical information including the type and dead-
weight tonnage of vessels navigating in the GOF during the two
analysed winter months (HELCOM, 2012).
2.3.5. Operational characteristics and damage estimation
The description of the operational characteristics of ships navigating
independently and the three described operations of icebreakers are
mainly definedby the analysis of registeredAIS information (e.g. report-
ed ship speeds) and the analysis of videos created from reported AIS
Table 3
Exposure to collision based on ice conditions. Classification performed by winter navigation experts.
Ice conditions A Ice conditions B Ice thickness Exposure to collision Classification
Consolidate, level, 
compact or very close 
pack ice
Rafted ice > 40
High
1
Ridge and hummocked 
ice
21 – 40 2
Fast Ice None
21 – 40 & >  
40
3
Close pack ice Rafted ice 21 – 40 
Average
4
New ice
Ridge and hummocked  
ice
01 – 20 5
None 01 – 20 6
Open pack ice None 01 – 20 
Low
7
Very open pack ice None 01 – 20 8
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wintertime (Ploskonka, 2013). The experts mentioned in point 2.3.3
have also contributed to backing up the main findings from the video
analysis and for a clearer representation of the context where damages
can occur. Appendix B presents more details about the variables esti-
mated for the operational characteristics of the winter navigation oper-
ations and the actual contexts defining these variables.
The estimation of the possible area of collision has been developed
by including a general analysis of the dimensions and locations of the
cargo vessels and tankers navigating during wintertime within the
GOF. For this purpose, Smailys and Česnauskis (2006) and McAllister
et al. (2003) are the two particular studies considered for this task.
The study by Smailys and Česnauskis (2006) is initially considered for
obtaining a detailed description of the general characteristics of differ-
ent types of tankers navigating in the Baltic. The study by McAllister
et al. (2003) presents details about the locations anddimensions of bun-
kers located in tankers and other different types of cargo ships (contain-
ership, ro–ro vessel, cruise ship, bulk carries, etc.). Thus, these two
sources of information are used to create descriptions of the layout of
tankers and bunkers of the vessels navigating in the GOF.
For the actual calculation of the possible damage extent derived
from collisions between ships, the simplified collision model (SIMCOL)
by Brown (2002) is utilized. This study provides a set of probabilities,
probability functions and equations to represent a specific collision sce-
nario in a Monte Carlo simulation. The scenarios are defined probabilis-
tically using a set of determined variables: collision angle, struck
location, deadweight tonnage of the striking vessel, deadweight ton-
nage and structural characteristics of the struck vessel, and the speed
of collision. This study has been implemented for the assessment of
10,000 collision scenarios including ships of different characteristics.
The results present the estimation of the damage extent in struck ves-
sels of different structure characteristics, including tankerswith one sin-
gle hull and also double hull. Appendix C describes the method for
damage estimation and the results from the influence of collision on
vessels with different structural characteristics and their incorporation
on this study for calculating the probabilities in the proposed risk man-
agement model of winter navigation operations.
The SIMCOL proposed by Brown (2002) represents the damage esti-
mation of collisions occurred in open sea waters. However, ice condi-
tions represent a different context where the strength of the collision
is higher due to the counterforce existing in severe ice conditions (e.g.
ice channel borders and unbroken ice). Thus, in open sea waters the
struck vessel is able to release certain degree of the total collision
strength due to the freedom of movement in the water. However, thisis not the case of collisions in ice conditions. Therefore, the inclusion
of the possible increased effect of collisions in the ice channel and un-
broken ice has been incorporated by including the results obtained by
Nelis et al. (2015). This study proposes amethodology for the prediction
of the collision damage in ice conditions. The methodology is based on
simulations where two tankers collide at a 90 degrees angle in ice.
Appendix C also presents details of this methodology and its incorpora-
tion on the calculation obtained in Brown (2002) and on the calcula-
tions for the probabilities in the constructed model in this study.
2.3.6. Human factor estimation
The analysis of the human interaction in the development of the four
assessed winter navigation operations is performed by executing an ex-
pert elicitation with the support of the Cognitive Reliability Error Anal-
ysis Method (CREAM) proposed by Hollnagel (1998). This approach
considers the influence of the performance conditions as more impor-
tant than the postulated human error probability (Hollnagel, 2012).
Thus, the combination of the input information from experts in winter
navigation and the CREAM enable the assessment of the main Common
Performance Conditions (CPCs) for the execution of the main relevant
tasks assigned to vessels and icebreakers crew working on the ship's
bridge at the moment the described winter navigation operations are
performed. The CREAM has previously been used to assess the human
error performance in oil tanker operations in (Akyuz, 2015; Martins
andMaturana, 2013). Thus, the evaluated CPCs in the riskmanagement
model of winter navigation are:
1. Adequacy of the organization
2. Available procedures and plans to execute the operations
3. Man–machine interface and operational support
4. Available time to plan and perform the operations
5. Training and preparation
6. The quality of the collaboration on the bridge.
For the quantification of the failure probability in each CPC, a de-
tailed expert elicitation process was executed. The relations of the
scores from adopted CPCs and the control modes are considered as pro-
posed in the extendedmethod for the calculation of the performance in-
fluence index and Cognitive Failure Probability (CFP) in He et al. (2008).
These CFPs pivot on three components in the assessment of the failure:
detecting, assessing and acting. These six CPCs and the threementioned
components are incorporated and assessed in a BN to determine the
probabilities of human error in each winter navigation operation. The
description of the expert elicitation process and the utilized methodol-
ogy is presented in detail in Valdez Banda et al. (2015b).
Table 4
Probability of collision depending on the level of the accidental exposure (due to ice con-
ditions) and the existence of human error.
Exposure Independent 
navigation
Convoy Towing Cutting 
loose
High 1 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.15
High 2 0.35 0.35 0.15 0.13
High 3 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.11
Average 4 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.09
Average 5 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.07
Average 6 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05
Low 7 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03
Low 8 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
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In order to calculate theprobability of collision, a combinatorial anal-
ysis between accident and expert data (see 2.3.2), exposure to accidents
due to ice conditions (see 2.3.3), and the human error probability (see
2.3.6) has been executed. The consideration of these three information
sources enables the designation of collision probability scales for each
type of winter navigation operation. Table 4 presents the designated
collision probability scales for each operation.
The designated probability of collision for each operation type re-
sulted from the integration of historical data of the accidents reported
during wintertime and assessments made by experts regarding the
complexity of different ice conditions and the influence of the human
performance. These established probabilities attempt to represent an
informative scale to assess the risk of collision in the development of
the analysed operations. Thus, the probabilities are degrees of belief
by experts based on the available information as the one described
above (Aven, 2010a).
2.3.8. The risk of oil spills
The potential oil spill derived after a collision is calculated based on
two general assumptions: the struck vessel is a tankerwith the common
characteristics of those navigating in Baltic Sea area (see Smailys and
Česnauskis, 2006) and the area of collision is on cargo tank(s), or the
struck vessel is also a tanker or another type of vessel but the area of col-
lision is on the bunker tanks.
For calculating the oil outflow from cargo tanks in a tanker, the study
by Smailys and Česnauskis (2006) is utilized. This study proposes a
modified methodology which is suitable for expeditious application
based on existing complex general purpose methods designated for es-
timation of the expected outflow. Themethodology is suitable for appli-
cation when there is also limited data about design of the cargo tanks
and particulars of the accident. The input data needed for applyingTable 5
The assessed RCOs designated to each CPC for supporting and improving the human per-
formance during winter navigation.
CPC name RCOs
Adequacy of the organization Improve organizational safety culture
Improve the safety management
Improve personnel's satisfaction
Available procedures and plans Improve emergency drills
Improve operational procedures
Man–machine interface and
operational support
Improve the process for designation of
responsibilities
Improve e-navigation support
Improve ship bridge design
Available time Improve time management
Training and preparation Improve navigational training
Improve planning skills
Improve safety and risk management
training
Collaboration quality Improve communication (in the bridge)this method are the volumes of the cargo tanks and probabilities of pos-
sible damage.
In the case of accidental oil spills from bunker tanks, the study per-
formed byMcAllister et al. (2003) is utilized to calculate the oil outflow.
This study provides a detailed risk assessment of oil spills from bunker
tanks of cargo vessels in the event of collision. The study proposes a
probabilistic oil outflow methodology based on IMO guidelines and
draught regulations. The study based its methodology on the data col-
lected and analysed from bunker oil spills in accidents occurred to dif-
ferent types of ships during a period of 14 years.
In the riskmanagementmodel of winter navigation proposed in this
paper, the calculation of the oil outflow in both cases depends on the
input data from the estimation of the damage extent (see 2.3.5) and
the characteristics of the vessels involved in the accidents (size, type,
traffic direction, and loading conditions). Thereby, these considered as-
pects are linked to calculation methods of the potential oil outflow pro-
posed in the twomentioned studies. Appendix D describesmore details
about the methodology for the calculation of the oil outflow from acci-
dental oil spill from cargo and bunker tanks and its integration to the
constructed model.
2.4. Risk control options: risk management model constitution (step 3)
In order to analyse and implement possible actions to reduce the risk
of collisions and accidental oil spills, 13 Risk Control Options (RCOs) are
integrated in the model structure (see Section 3.1). These RCOs are fo-
cused in the analysis and detection of potential areas of opportunity in
the performance of the ship's and icebreaker's crew who are located
in the bridge executing different tasks at the moment the four analysed
winter navigation operations are implemented. The analysis of the tasks
involved in the execution of ship operations has previously been imple-
mented in the assessment of ship collisions (see Hänninen and Kujala,
2012). In the structure of the risk management model of winter naviga-
tion, to each CPC included for the analysis of human performance (see
point 2.3.6), one or more RCOs are designated. The aim of this section
of themodel is to assess the potential influence of these RCOs in the per-
formance of the crew when executing the operations. Table 5 presents
the 13 RCOs designated to improve the human performance during
winter navigation operations.
In order to include the values for calculating the potential influence
of the proposed RCOs on the winter navigation operations, an expert
elicitation is performed. Experts from Finland and Russia participated
in the elicitation. The consulted experts included ship and icebreaker
captains and officers with significant time of experience in the practical
development of navigational operations during wintertime. More de-
tails about the description of the RCOs, information about the consultedFig. 2. Themain structure of the proposed “riskmanagementmodel of winter navigation”.
Fig. 3. The constructed Bayesian network model for the analysis of the four winter navigation operations. This figure presents the model for the analysis of ship independent navigation
(*the included components of the operational characteristics used to estimate the damage extent differ in each winter navigation operation, see Appendix B).
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et al. (2015b).
3. Results
3.1. The model structure
The structure of the final model initially includes a network
presenting different sub-models which contain several componentsTable 6
The estimated percentage of improvement in human performance with the application of the
RCOs
Indepe
naviga
FIN
Improve navigational training 17%
Improve safety and risk management training 17%
Improve e-navigation support 15%
Improve time management 10%
Improve planning skills with training 0%
Improve ship bridge design 12%
Improve organizational safety culture 6%
Improve the safety management 6%
Improve personnel's satisfaction 4%
Improve emergency drills 0%
Improve operational procedures 0%
Improve the process for designation of 
responsibilities
0%
Improve communication (in the bridge) 6%included in the four models constructed to evaluate the probabili-
ties of collision and potential oil spills in the four analysed winter
navigation operations. Moreover, as a way to easily find the resulted
probabilities of the main outcome variables of the network, other
sub-models are also incorporated. These sub-models have a direct
access to the main output variables of the four models created for
the analysis of winter navigation operations. Fig. 2 presents the
general structure of the risk management model of winter
navigation.proposed RCOs.
Percentage of improvement
ndent 
tion
Convoy Towwing Cutting loose 
RUS FIN RUS FIN RUS FIN RUS
13% 13% 19% 13% 13% 13% 12%
13% 13% 8% 13% 13% 13% 12%
9% 13% 8% 13% 7% 9% 9%
5% 12% 5% 12% 5% 13% 5%
13% 0% 8% 0% 13% 0% 12%
0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 13% 0%
5% 7% 4% 6% 3% 6% 6%
3% 7% 2% 8% 1% 8% 3%
5% 4% 6% 5% 5% 4% 6%
8% 0% 8% 0% 8% 0% 6%
8% 0% 8% 0% 8% 0% 6%
7% 0% 8% 0% 8% 0% 8%
0% 3% 0% 3% 0% 3% 0%
Fig. 4.Percentage of expected improvement in ship/icebreaker crew's performance (located in the bridge)with the combination of theproposed RCOs for eachwinter navigation operation
(Finnish experts).
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the analysis of the analysed winter navigation operations. The other
nodes presented in the figure are used for having an easy and fast access
to the probabilities of collision, damage extent, potential oil spills in m3,
the actual oil spill in tons, and the effect of the risk control options. Fig. 3
presents the resulted Bayesian network(s) included in each sub-model
for the analysis of risks in the four winter navigation operations.
3.2. Improve-benefit analysis: risk management model analysis (step 4)
The analysis of the influence of the RCOs after the execution of the
elicitation with winter navigation experts from Finland and Russia has
identified which are the potential actions with a more significant posi-
tive effect to ensure and improve the performance of the crew located
on ships and icebreakers. Table 6 presents the estimated percentage of
improvement of eachRCOproposed, classified by operation and country
of the consulted experts.
Furthermore, the model is able to identify which are the most effec-
tive combinations between the proposed RCOs in each operation. Figs. 4
and 5 present fourmatrices describing the combination of the RCOs and
the generated percentage of expected improvement of the human per-
formance for the four analysed operations. The estimations made by
winter navigation experts in Finland and Russia are depicted in Figs. 4
and 5 respectively.
3.3. Recommendations: the outcome of the risk management model (step 5)
3.3.1. Model general outcome
Based on the analysis of accident statistics, ship independent naviga-
tion and convoy are the winter navigation operations whit the higher
probability of collision. In the functioning of themodel, the combination
between accident statistics, the established probabilities for the expo-
sure to collision, and the probability representing the humanFig. 5.Percentage of expected improvement in ship/icebreaker crew's performance (located in th
(Russian experts).performance, presents also higher risk of collision in the twomentioned
operations.
The analysis of the operational characteristics in eachwinter naviga-
tion operation enables the extraction of the probabilities of oil spill.
Table 7 presents the probability of oil spill from cargo tanks and bunkers
which are obtained with the application of the risk management model
of winter navigation.
3.3.2. Extended results from the analysed RCOs
Improving navigational training, improving riskmanagement training
and improving e-navigation support are the RCOswith a higher probabil-
ity to improve theperformanceof the crew located in thebridgewhenex-
ecuting the four analysed operations (see point 3.2). In this section, an
extended description of the results obtained by the analysed RCOs with
the experts is presented. The aim is to describe inmore details the results
of the analysis of human factor and its connectionwith the detected areas
of opportunity for improvements in the winter navigation operations.
This information represents the extendeddescription of particular aspects
needed in connection with the implementation of the proposed RCOs.
The explanatory description of these aspects were obtained during the
expert consultations. Tables 8 and 9 presents detailed information ex-
tracted from the consultation performed with to winter navigation the
mentioned experts in Finland and Russia.
4. Discussion
4.1. The model structure
Basing the foundations of the produced risk management model of
winter navigation on the structure of the FSA proposed by IMO, enables
the establishment of a tool for supporting a risk analysis and manage-
ment of the most practiced navigational operations during wintertime
at the GOF. The tool is able to combine the most relevant elements fore bridge)with the combination of theproposed RCOs for eachwinter navigation operation
Table 7
The probability of oil spill by operation.
Oil spill in tons Probability by operation*
Independent
navigation
Convoy Towing Cutting loose
Cargo oil
1–1000 0.002 0.001 1.0E−05 1.2E−05
1000–5000 0.005 0.002 0 1.02E−05
5000–15,000 0.004 0.002 0 6.6E−05
N15,000 0.003 0.003 0 0
Bunker oil
1–1000 0.002 0.002 9.4E−05 5.7E−04
1000–5000 0.005 0.005 8.4E−05 9.0E−05
N5000 0.001 0.001 8.4E−05 7.2E−06
Higher spill sizes overestimates due to limitations of underlying engineering models.
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tions in the GOF during wintertime, the context (ice conditions) where
the operations are preformed, and the analysis of the human perfor-
mance. Together, these elements are used to calculate the risk of colli-
sion and potential oil spills derived from it.
For the analysis of these mentioned elements, several methodologies
are implemented. A method for the calculation of the damage extent in
ship-to-ship collisions in ice conditions (Brown, 2002; Nelis et al.,
2015), methods for estimating the potential oil spills after the collision
(McAllister et al., 2003; Smailys and Česnauskis, 2006), and a method
for human error quantification (Hollnagel, 1998; He et al., 2008). More-
over, several information sources are needed to provide input data for ex-
ecuting the mentioned methods. Thus, using Bayesian networks as the
mean to create the model structure enables the integration of the listed
methods and several information sources such as historical information
registered in data bases (e.g. accidents reported and traffic statistics)
and qualitative information extracted and adapted from expert consulta-
tions (e.g. determining the influence of the human factor).
In general, the constructed structure of the model provides options to
use it as a tool to display and easily represent the risk of collision and ac-
cidental oil spill, and/or as tool to analyse the influences between the dif-
ferent variables involved during the execution of the winter navigation
operations.Table 8
Detailed issues pointed during the analysis of the influence of the human factor on the develop
CPC assessed as less efficient Available procedures and plans for managing and sup
Issues detected:
- Extensive paper work demanded during the perf
Need detected:
- Better integration of regulatory demands, admini
Other facts:
- The quality of instructions contained in the operati
of the operations.
Operation Issues and needs detected
Ship independent navigation Issues detected:
- The operation is evaluated as the lowest in terms
- The lack of experience and skills demanded for th
Need detected:
- Improvement of navigational training is the actio
Convoy Issues detected:
- Lack of real time information and methods for cre
Need detected:
- Adequate navigational training and training for c
- New technological tools and methodologies for en
operations
Cutting loose Issues detected:
- The execution of the operations relies almost com
Need detected:
- Adequate navigational training and training for c
- Improving the ship bridge design can bring signifi4.2. The results obtained from the model application
4.2.1. Risk of collision and accidental oil spill and the elements for its
calculation
The model presents ship independent navigation and convoy as
the two operations with the higher risk of collision which can lead
to oil spills. The model indicates that the probability of these acci-
dental events is higher in the case of ship independent navigation
and convoy represents the second operation with a higher risk. The
accidental risk of these two operations is also represented in the
accidental reports analysed in (Valdez Banda et al., 2015a) and
confirmed by the results obtained from the expert consultation
performed in this study and the general results obtained from the
model application.
The model indicates that oil spills of 1000 to 5000 tons are the most
probable (with a maximum of 1.4% probability) to occur in the two
mentioned operations, these combining oil spills from cargo tanks and
bunkers. Major oil spills, meaning spills over 15,000 tons, are less prob-
able (with a maximum of 0.8% probability) and these are mainly rising
from collisions with oil tanker vessels during the execution of themen-
tioned operations. In the case of towing and cutting loose operations,
the probability of collisions ending in oil spills is almost non-existent.
Thus, the model and its informative outcome can be utilized for
supporting the planning of the required capacities for oil spill response
vessels in sea ice conditions within the GOF, which is a relevant issue in
oil spill risk management (International Maritime Organizations, IMO,
2010). Thereby, providing elements to support the analysis and man-
agement of the risk of accidental oil spills in a navigational context
where little research has been performed (Lehikoinen et al., 2015,
2013; Montewka et al., 2014; Nelis et al., 2015).
The application of this model aims at providing representative
trends for identifying the risks and areas of opportunity within the de-
velopment of the analysed winter navigation operations. Thus, proba-
bilities are using for that particular purpose and these should not be
interpreted asmean to predict the oncoming state of thewinter naviga-
tion operations. The subjective nature of the risk analysis, where uncer-
tainties are assessed in a comprehensive manner, is acknowledged e.g.
by Flage et al. (2014) and the results should be understood as such.
Moreover, thismodel is constructed under the characteristic of Bayesian
networks which is limited to provide certain understanding of safetyment of winter navigation operations (Finnish experts).
porting the winter navigation operations
ormance of the operations
strative procedures and the resulted safety management demands
onal procedures and plans is good and it fulfils the essential needs for the development
of efficiency.
e performance of this operation is a constant issue.
n proposed to enhance the efficiency of the operation.
ating an appropriate situational awareness and guide the execution of the operation
reating better methods for assessing the risks of the operation
hancing situational awareness for supporting an efficient control of this and also other
pletely in the knowledge and skills of the master.
reating better methods for assessing the risks of the operation
cant advantages for supporting an operation in which ship manoeuvring is crucial.
Table 9
Detailed issues pointed during the analysis of the influence of the human factor on the development of winter navigation operations (Russian experts).
CPC assessed as less efficient Man–machine interface and operational support for the execution of the operations
Issues detected:
- Without appropriate expertise and training, technology can be inefficiently implemented and used.
Need detected:
- Expertise, adequate navigational training, and appropriate methods for managing the risk and safety of the operations
Other facts:
- Technology is a crucial component to support winter navigation operations nowadays.
Operation Issues and needs detected
Ship independent navigation Issues detected:
- Ship independent navigation and convoy operations ranked as the lowest in terms of efficiency
Need detected:
- Improve navigational training and risk and safety management training
- Creating more efficient plans for ship voyage
- Better communication with other relevant partners in the execution of the operation and better integration of those in
the planning phase
- New ways for ship routing in complex ice scenarios
Convoy Issues detected:
- Ship independent navigation and convoy operations ranked as the lowest in terms of efficiency
Need detected:
- Improve navigational training and risk and safety management training
- Creating more efficient plans for executing the operation
- Better communication with other relevant partners in the execution of the operation and better integration of those
included in the planning phase
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the analysis (Hänninen, 2014; Montewka et al., 2014).
4.2.2. The analysis of human factor and the proposed RCOs
The description and assessment of the human performance influ-
ence on the development of the winter navigation operations attempt
to numerically represent the impact from themain executors of the op-
erations (ship/icebreaker master and his/her crew) on the accidental
risk of collisions. This analysis is strengthened by incorporating the cur-
rent outcome of the operations based on accident statistics and the an-
alytical contribution from other relevant partners supporting the
execution of the operations.
The results of the analysis of the human performance are presented
in the contexts of two nations heavily involved in the navigational oper-
ations in the GOF. First, the analysis performed with winter navigation
experts from Finland detected that the available procedures and plans
for managing and supporting the winter navigation operations is the
CPCwith thehigher need for improvement. This group of experts partic-
ular pointed out the need for having safety management systems and
methodologies with a more efficient integration between safety regula-
tory and administrative demands and the correct understanding of the
practical context of the operations. Second, the analysis performed
with experts from Russia appraised man–machine interface and opera-
tional support for the execution of the operations as the CPC with the
higher need for improvement. These experts identified the need for pro-
viding adequate formation to the persons responsible for executing the
operations in order to have an efficient utilization of the different used
technologies for controlling the operations while keeping an appropri-
ate situational awareness at any time during their execution.
The two groups of experts have assessed navigational training and
safety and risk management training as the most efficient RCOs to im-
prove the performance of winter navigation operations. These are
linked to the lack of expertise and adequate formation to perform ship
navigational operations particularly in extreme ice conditions which is
also an issuementioned by the experts. The experts from Finland partic-
ularly pointed out the need for developing actions of improvement
which are focused on creatingmethods which can properly understand
and analyse the risk of winter navigation. Furthermore, these methods
must adequately integrate the developments of new technologies
for supporting the situational and operational awareness. Theimprovement of the design in the human operational environment is
also pointed as a potential action for supporting the execution of the op-
erations, particularly in cutting loose operations. Thus, opening theneed
for developing analysis of work environment, collaboration modes and
ergonomics applied in the context of the operation. In this context, prac-
tical training on-board and the use of ship simulators is essential for
providing appropriate formation for the personnel working on the
bridge and also for testing the function of the utilized technologies.
Russian experts stated the need for improving planning skills aiming
at enhancing the quality and efficiency of the ship voyage plans. They
have also mentioned the need for having better communication with
other winter navigation members assisting in the development and
control of the operations. Thus, finding new ways for supporting the
planning and monitoring of the operations with icebreakers and VTS
centres, and improving the practicalities of the operations with pilots.
Thus, the two groups of experts seem to share ideas that for control-
ling the risks of the winter navigation operations, the improvement of
the skills and knowledge of the personnel executing the operations is
the action to implement. However, it is important to remark that ex-
perts specified that improving skills and knowledge requires of training
which has been structured based on reasoned elements extracted from
the analysis of the operations. Thus, avoiding the common reaction of
just increasing the amount of training when the need for training is de-
tected (Er, 2005; Gholamreza and Wolff, 2008). The role of technologi-
cal tools and appropriate working environments for supporting winter
navigation is also pointed as essential element to improve the perfor-
mance of the operations. Nevertheless, the experts particularly men-
tioned that technology is efficient as long the knowledge and
expertise of the people are also adequate to exploit its maximum
capacity.
The influence of the RCOs on the improvement of the human perfor-
mance has straightforward representation in the risk management
model of winter navigation. The use of probabilities to portray the influ-
ence of each RCO on the values of the human performance and the stat-
ed risk of collision represents a simple form for describing the results of
applying an elaborated method for analysis of human performance. An-
other significant advantage of the model is the possibility of detecting
which RCOs are probably more efficient when are jointly applied (see
Figs. 4 and 5). Thus, for ship independent navigation, improvement of
safety and risk management training and navigational training is the
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combination is pointed by the experts from Russia, but the effect is not
as strongly represented as in the case of Finland. Convoy operations
have the improvement of e-navigation support and risk management
training as themost effective combination of RCOs based on Finnish ex-
perts. Russian experts marked the improvement of e-navigation sup-
port and improvement of operational procedures as the most effective
combination of RCOs in the same operation.
The application of this model is not evaluating the cost of the RCOs,
aswould be required by the original process of the FSA. For the reason of
brevity this has been changed for a representation of an improved-
benefit analysis in the application of these RCOs. This is a detected lim-
itation of the model which aims at pointing an area of opportunity for
future research in the topic.
4.3. Evaluation of the model and data
The process for evaluation of themodel and data is based on the va-
lidity criteria for the analysis of risk proposed in Aven and Heide (2009)
and adapted in Goerlandt and Kujala (2014). This focused on defining
the reliability of themodel and data in terms of accuracy of the riskmet-
ric and reliability in terms of ranking across different part of the system.
The process includes 4 stages:
- One, defining the degree to which the produce risk numbers are ac-
curate compared to the underlying true risk. Themodel is structured
based on the risk perspective specified in Eq. (1); it does not make
claims about the true probability of collision and potential oil spill.
Rather, the model applies a quantitative ranking based on a combi-
nation of probabilities extracted fromhistorical data and estimations
made by experts about the risk level of different ice contexts. As the
main aimof themodel is to convey an argumentation based on avail-
able evidence, accounting for uncertainties of outcome and in the
underlying evidence, there is no reference to an underlying “true”
risk. This follows from the adopted risk perspective as described in
Section 2.3.1.
- Two, defining the degree to which epistemic uncertainty assess-
ments are complete. Appendix E presents a classification of the var-
iables and their sources of information where the strength of the
background knowledge is defined. The process to assess the strength
of the knowledge is adapted from the basic ideas proposed in
Goerlandt and Montewka (2015a); Kloprogge et al. (2011) and
Flage and Aven (2009) which are combined for presenting a single
classification process presented in Valdez Banda et al. (2015a).
- Three, defining the degree to which the analysis addresses the right
quantities (model parameters and observable events). The present-
ed model is focused on observable events (ship collisions) rather
than a “probability” which cannot be interpreted. The aim of the
model is to estimate probabilities about (possibly) real events
based on the risk perspective described in Section 2.3.1. The quantity
of interest is actually the observable characteristics and events of the
system (the variables in the model).
- Four, defining how well the constructed model represents the win-
ter navigation operations, construct validity as expressed in
Trochim and Donnelly (2008). This type of validity focused on the
evaluation of face and content validity. Face validity reviews
operationalisation and the degree to how the obtained results repre-
sent a good translation of the construct. Content validity reviews
operationalisation against the relevant content domain for the con-
struct. Thus, these forms of validation are represented in this
model by incorporating analysis of accidents reported in the context
of interest (ice conditions), this is also strengthened by incorporat-
ing a risk analysis of these conditions based on expert knowledge.
Moreover, the model provides appropriate methods for estimating
the possible outcome of a collision in ice conditions and to assess
the influence of the human performance on the development ofthe operations. However, neither accident reports nor the consulted
experts contain information and/or have experience about the oil
spills in ice conditions within the GOF.
5. Conclusions
This article has introduced a riskmanagementmodel forwinter nav-
igation operations which is structured in a Bayesian network based on
the stated methodology of the FSA by IMO. The model incorporates
and process data from reported accidents, ship traffic and ice conditions
statistics. Furthermore, the model also includes qualitative information
extracted from the analysis of human performance in the execution of
the operations. The model also comprehends different methodologies
for the analysis of the human error, the calculation of the damage extent
derived from collision in ice conditions, and the potential amount of oil
spills during wintertime navigation operations in the GOF. The con-
structed model can be utilized in probabilistic reasoning about the de-
pendency patterns between several variables involved in the
execution of the most common winter navigation operations executed
by ships and icebreakers.
Ship independent navigation and convoy are the navigational oper-
ations with the higher risk of collisions deriving in potential oil spills
during winter time in the GOF. The model presents minor oil spills
(b5000 tons) as the most probable to occur, and these seem to be
only possible during the execution of the two mentioned operations.
In these operations, major oil spills (N15,000 tons) are less probable
but not impossible based on themodel results. On the other hand, colli-
sions which may cause potential oil spills during towing and cutting
loose operations seem to be very unlikely.
The proposed model enables the implementation of a more in deep
analysis of different context involved in the execution of the operations.
In the analysis of the performance of the people involved in the practical
execution of the operations, ship independent navigation and convoy
are the operations detected as the ones with the higher need for
human performance improvement. The existing procedures and plans
for managing and supporting the winter navigation operations and
the man–machine interface and operational support for the execution
of the operations are the performance conditions of the winter naviga-
tion operations which are in a higher need of improvement. The im-
provement of navigational training and safety and risk management
training seem to be the most recommendable options to control the
risk of failures in human performancewhichmay lead to accidental col-
lisions and oil spills. The creation ofmore efficient electronic navigation-
al tools and a better planning of the operations are the RCOs in the
second level of priority based on the results presented in the model. It
can be concluded that the proposedmodel can serve as decision support
tool which is capable to analyse andmanage the risks of the winter nav-
igation operations performed in the GOF.
In regard to expanding the model usability, in future the model
could incorporate new options focused in controlling the risks of the
existing traffic and ice conditions, and new options for the technical
specifications of ships structures and implementation of the operations.
Moreover, the cost–benefit analysis of the proposed RCOs is another op-
tion that should be taken into consideration. Thus, these aspects could
certainly provide new means to the consideration of which elements
of safety and risk management should be also tackled in order to
strength the presented study and the general safety of winter naviga-
tion in GOF.
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Appendix A. Vessel traffic statistics in the Gulf of FinlandMarch 2011
and January 2012 (HELCOM, 2012)
Table A.1
Type of vessels navigating in ice conditions at the GOF.Vessel typeG
C
B
R
R
V
O
O
LN
R
P
Fig. A.1. Types of vessels n
Fig. A.2. Types of vessels naMarch 2011avigating the GOF in March 201
vigating the GOF in January 201January 2012eneral Cargo 206 188
ontainership 102 79
ulk Carrier 67 41
o-ro Cargo 43 33
eefer 27 19
ehicles Carrier 26 15
il Crude Tanker 79 68
il/Chemical Tanker 135 100
G Tanker 7 5o-Pax 39 42
assenger 7 8
ther 102 79O1.
2.Table A.2
Deadweight tonnage of the vessels navigating the GOF during wintertime (in ice
conditions).Fi
M
Fi
JaDWT (in thousands)g. A.3. Deadweight tonnage (in thousa
arch 2011 and January 2012.
g. A.4.Deadweight tonnage (in thousand
nuary 2012.March 2011nds) of the vessels (all type) n
s) of tankers navigating duringJanuary 2012- 5 254 206
- 10 278 232
0 - 20 128 108
0 - 40 71 55
0 - 60 20 15
0 - 80 16 15
0 - 100 8 2
00 - 120 60 42
40 - 160 5 31avigating during
March 2011 and
Fig. B.2.Meeting in unbroken ice or ice covered water.
Fig. B.1.Meeting in ice channel.
Appendix B. Variables considered for the analysis of the operational characteristics and the calculation of the damage extent
Table B.1
The variables utilized for the analysis of the operational context of winter navigation. These variables and their respective states are utilized for the estimation of the possible damage ex-
tent in each particular winter navigation operation after an occurred collision.
Variable State Winter navigation operation Probability estimated from:
Independent navigation Convoy Towing Cutting loose
1. Encounter situation 1. Meeting in ice channel ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ Video analysis (AIS data analysed
in Ploskonka (2013)) and expert
knowledge
2. Meeting in unbroken ice or ice cover water ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
3. Crossing in ice channel ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
4. Crossing in unbroken ice or ice cover water ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
5. Passing in ice channel ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
6. Passing in unbroken ice or ice cover water ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
2. Struck vessel 1. Tankers ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ Traffic statistics (AIS data)
2. Others ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
3. Collision angle 1–19. Nineteen angles in a scale of 10,
from 0° to 180°
✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ Video analysis (AIS data)
4. Speed of collision 1. 1 to 5 kn ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ AIS data
2. 5 to 10 kn ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
3. 10 to 15 kn ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
4. 15 to 20 kn ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
5. N20 kn ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
5. Manoeuvring space 1. Ice channel ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Video analysis (AIS data) and expert
knowledge2. Unbroken ice ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
3. Ice cover water ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗
6. Struck area 1. Cargo area (tank) ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ Tankers and bunkers layout
2. Bunker ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
3. Other area ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
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This variable is utilized for the analysis of ship independent naviga-
tion. It describes the winter navigational context where collisions
make occur. The Figs. B.1 to B.6 represent the states (context) includ-
ed in the encounter situation.
2. Struck vessel
This variable contains two general states: the probability that the
struck vessel is a tanker and the probability that the struck vessel is
other than a tanker. These probabilities are estimated based on the
registered traffic conditions in the GOF (Appendix A).
3. Collision angle
This variable has 19 states (possible angles of collision), starting
from 0° angle and ending with 180° angle. The assessment ofFig. B.4. Crossing in unbroken ice or ice covered water.
Fig. B.3. Crossing in ice channel.
Fig. B.6. Passing in unbroken ice or ice covered water.
Fig. B.8. Potential collision angles in convoy operations.
Fig. B.9. Potential collision angles in towing operations.
Fig. B.10. Potential collision angles in cutting loose operations
Fig. B.5. Passing in ice channel.
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damage extent in each operation. The probabilities of these angles
are based on the analysis of the videos describing the practical
performance of winter navigation operations. The videos are pro-
duced by using the registered AIS data during 01.01.–31.03.2011.
Figs. B.7 to B.10 present the potential angles of collision by
operation.
4. Speed of collision
This variable includes five states describing a certain range of speed
registered during the performance of each winter navigation opera-
tion. These speeds are also obtained from the analysis of the AISFig. B.7. Potential collision angles in ship independent navigation.data registered during 01.01.–31.03.2011. Fig. B.11 reported speeds
during the performance of all winter navigation operations.
5. Manoeuvring space
This variable describes the three main general sea ice context
in which operations are performed: ice channel, unbroken ice
and ice covered water (light ice conditions). The probabilities
for each state (context) are estimated from the ice conditions
registered in the AIS data during 01.01.–31.03.2011. Icebreak-
er operations are only executed in ice channel and unbroken
ice.
6. Struck area
The probabilities for the three states of this variable are estimated
after analysing the layout of tankers and bunkers in different types
of vessels described in McAllister et al. (2003) and Smailys and
Česnauskis (2006). For this estimation, general layouts describing
the location of tankers and bunkers are created. Moreover, estima-
tion of the percentages that tankers and bunkers cover within the
complete structure of vessels have also been elaborated. Figs. B.12
and B.13 present the elaborated general layout describing the loca-
tion of tankers and bunkers.
B
G
C
P
Fig. B.13. General layout of bunker locations in different type of ships.
Fig. B.11. Registered speeds during winter navigation operations (01-31.03.2011).
Fig. B.12. General layout of tanks in ship tankers.
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ship collision
The evaluation of the damage extent initially requires the input from
the factors described in Appendix B and also the traffic statisticsdescribed in AppendixA. These twodocuments include the speed of col-
lision and the characteristics of the struck and striking vessel which are
fundamental to determine the damage extent and impact penetration
presented by Brown (2002).
The bow entrance angle is another relevant factor for elaborat-
ing the calculations, this parameter is obtained for the considered
vessels types in this mentioned study. Table C.1 presents the
values of the regression coefficients for encountering vessel mass
and angles. The mass of encountering vessel Mev is conditional to
the vessel type, size and also loading conditions. The mass of
fully laden general cargo, bulk carrier, container, and passenger
vessels is obtained from data-based regression models presented
by Brown (2002). Table C.1 also presents the regression coeffi-
cients when having a statistical fit with R2 values around 0.98. In
the risk management model proposed in this study, this informa-
tion is also influenced by the description of ship direction within
the GOF (see Section 2.3.8). Thus, the functional form is described
as follows, with L the ship length:
Mₑᵥ ¼ a
ffiffi
L
p
c
: ðC:1Þ
Table C.1
Regression coefficients for encountering vessel mass and bow entrance angle η, based on
Brown (2002).Ship type c a ηulk carrier 6.6 0.332 40
eneral cargo 6.93 0.325 40
ontainer ship 5.49 0.353 34
assenger ship 8.22 0.299 34
anker N/A N/A 76TThus, considering the calculations and results obtained in the total
number of cases studied in the mentioned analysis, estimations for the
probabilities of hull penetration and damage length inmetres are possi-
ble to extract. These estimations refer to ship to ship collision on a 90 de-
grees' angle. Table C.2 presents the cases collected from Sandia Report
and limited USCG Tanker collision data as presented in Brown (2002),
the probability calculation for damage extent and hull penetration and
the estimated number of tanks affected.
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Probabilities for hull penetration, damage length and tanks affected in ship to ship collision
on 90° angle (values adopted from Brown, 2002).Metresb
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
M
M
M
M
M
MNumber of casesTable C.3
Probabilities of affecta
navigating in the GOF
Area affected
0 tanks
1 tank
2 tanks
BunkerProbabilitytion of tanks and bunker
.
Pr
0.
0.
0.
0.Tanks affectedaHull
penetrationDamage
lengthHull
penetrationDamage
lengthHull
penetrations in tankers
obability
792
087
005
117Damage
length1 2533 2546 0.261 0.254 0 1
2533 6000 0.261 0.598 0 1
1200 1200 0.124 0.120 0 1
700 200 0.072 0.019 1 1
550 50 0.057 0.005 1 1
450 25 0.046 0.002 1 1
370 5 0.038 0.000 1 1
300 0 0.030 0 1 1
325 0 0.033 0 2 (b) 11220 0 0.022 0 2 (b) 1
20 120 0 0.012 0 2 (b) 2 (b)
31 100 0 0.010 0 2 (b) 2 (b)
42 90 0 0.009 0 2 (b) 2 (b)
43 80 0 0.008 0 2 (b) 2 (b)
54 70 0 0.007 0 2 (
b) 2 (b)
65 30 0 0.003 0 2 (
b) 2 (b)
76 15 0 0.001 0 2 (c) 2 (b)
87 5 0 0.001 0 2 (d) 2 (b)1
9
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1a Considering the layout of (6 × 2) and the values (in metres) of the tanker distance in
beam and length (see Brown, 2002).
b Accounts for two tanks affected only for tankers of 5000 deadweight tonnage.
c Accounts for two tanks affected only for tankers from 5000 to 40,000 deadweight
tonnage.
d Accounts for two tanks affected only for tankers from 5000 to 60,000 deadweight
tonnage.
Thus, considering the values obtained in Table C.2 and the defined
layout of the tankers navigating in the GOF (described in Appendix B).
Table C.3 presents the probabilities of affectations in tanks and bunkers.The study by Brown (2002) considers single hull tankers of 45,000
and 15,000 dead weight tonnage (DWT) (SH 150 and S45) and double
hull tankers also of 45,000 and 150 DWT (DH45 and DH150). Thus, a
mean collision scenario is defined as thepoint of reference for the values
of the main variables required for the calculation of the damage extent.
Table C.4 presents the damages values of this mean scenario.
Table C.4
Mean scenario and damage values.Mean value DH150 SH150 DH45 SH45ean struck ship velocity (kn) 2.49
ean striking ship velocity (kn) 4.27
ean strike location 0.47
ean collision angle 90
ean striking ship displacement (tons) 13,660
ean damage penetration 1385 2.28 1281 1571
ean damage length 2523 3.87 2291 2809MThus, the mean values for double hull tankers (DH150) are utilized
for generating penetration values depending on the collision angle,
speed and deadweight tonnage of the striking ship. The selection this
type of tanker enables the covering of the potential scenario with
most serious consequence in the GOF. The values of DH150 presented
in Brown (2002) are adopted for the calculations in to this study.Initially, the potential penetration depending on different speeds is cal-
culated. Then, the penetration depending on the angle of collision is also
calculated. Finally, the penetration depending of the deadweight ton-
nage of the striking vessel is also calculated. For the last two calcula-
tions, a speed of 6 knots is utilized as reference. Table C.5 present the
obtained reference values.
Table C.5
Reference values for damage penetration in double hull tanker DH150 based on speed,
deadweight tonnage and angle of collision of the striking ship.Collision speed (kn)–
penetration (m)Collision angle (°)–
penetration
(m) (in 6 kn speed)Striking vessel
DW (tons)–
penetration (m)–0.4 0–0 0–0
–0.64625 10–0 5000–0.38
–0.8925 20–0 10,000–0.92
–1.13875 30–0.42 13,660–1.385
.27–1.11385 40–0.76 15,000–1.4
–1.670833 50–1.1 20,000–1.8
–1.956667 60–1.44 40,000–2.6
–2.2425 70–1.78 60,000–3.05
–2.528333 80–1.79 80,000–3.3
–2.814167 90–1.8 100,000–3.5
0–3.1 100–1.4855 120,000–3.7
1–3.5 110–1.3333 140,000–3.9
2–3.9 120–1.1 160,000–4
3–4.3 130–0765
4–4.7 140–0.43
5–5.1 150–0
6–5.68 160–0
6–6.26 170–0
8–6.84 180–0
9–7.42
0–82In March 2011, about 60% of the vessels navigating in the GOF were
ice class IA. Ice class IB accounts for about 13% of the total vessels regis-
tered and ice classes IC, II and IA super share similar percentages (Valdez
Banda et al., 2015a). The hull structured design demanded for ice classes
IA, IB, IC (see Finnish Transport Safety Agency, Trafi, 2010) have
been particular considered when selecting the structural characteristics
for calculating the damage extent on vessels which are not tankers.
Therefore, a similar process (as the one described above) was executed
for calculating the damage extent on a single hull tanker of 45,000 dead-
weight tonnage (SH45). The selection of the SH45 provides a point of
reference which better represents the type of vessels navigating in the
GOF.
Finally, the update of the values for calculating the damage extent in
the context of a collision in ice conditions (e.g. in the ice channel and/or
in unbroken ice) are elaborated by utilizing the study performed by
(Nelis et al., 2015). This study implements an approachwhich considers
the failure of ice sheet by bending and then ridding down the sloping
surface. The reference ice thickness considered in the study is 1.5 m.
Thus, utilizing the results obtained by Nelis et al. (2015) and the values
of the tankers DH 150 and SH45 presented in Brown (2002) is possible
to see an increment of about 12% in the penetration damage in collisions
under ice conditions. Surprisingly, the results of the collision calcula-
tions in ice have not significantly increase the deformation energy and
penetration depth of struck ship compared with open water collision
(Nelis et al., 2015).
Fig. C.1 presents a matrix describing collision scenarios which may
lead to potential penetration of a tanker in a DH150. The description
of these scenarios depends on the collision angle and speed. Moreover,
these values are updated depending on the DWT of the striking vessel.
Fig. C.2 presents the potential penetration of a tanker DH150 in the con-
text of a collision in ice conditions. Figs. C.3 and C.4 present similar ma-
trices for the values of the tanker SH45 which is utilized for calculating
the damage of bunkers in other vessels.
Fig. C.1.Matrix describing the angle of collision and speed of striking vessels (classified by DWT) which may cause the penetration of a cargo tank in a tanker DH150.
Fig. C.2.Matrix describing the angle of collision and speed of striking vessels (classified by DWT) which may cause the penetration of a cargo tank in a tanker DH150 (in ice channel and
unbroken ice).
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Fig. C.4.Matrix describing the angle of collision and speed of striking vessels (classified by DWT) which may cause the penetration of a cargo tank in a tanker SH45 (in ice channel and
unbroken ice).
Fig. C.3.Matrix describing the angle of collision and speed of striking vessels (classified by DWT) which may cause the penetration of a cargo tank in a tanker SH45.
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the event of collision
The calculation of the potential oil outflow from accidental oil spills
initially requires the input from the factors described in Appendixes A, B
and C. These appendixes provide information regarding the characteris-
tics of ship traffic in the GOF, the input information regarding the lay-
outs of cargo and bunker tanks, and the estimation of potential
damage in the event of collision. Moreover, information regarding traf-
fic direction and loading conditions is also relevant to estimate the oil
outflow, this information is obtained based on analysed AIS data andthe reported points of departure and arrival marked in the planned
buoyance of the vessels included in this data.
The calculation of the oil outflow from cargo tanks is based on a sim-
plified method proposed by Smailys and Česnauskis (2006). The appli-
cation of this simplified method is based on two main assumptions:
the number of constructive design of tankers is limited to certain region
(in this case Baltic Sea) and their hull and cargo tank geometrical char-
acteristics are similar. As a fact, the length of all arranged cargo tanks for
the majority of tankers is the same (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015a).
The method considers the typical arrange of cargo tanks in tanker nav-
igating in this area and its dependency on the size (DWT) of these
TP
9
2
B
2
2
3
4
1
LN
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out specifications presented in Appendix B.
For the calculation of the cargo volume, the initial volume of a cargo
tank is calculated as product of its length, width, height and correspond-
ing volumetric coefficient. The volumetric coefficients are calculated
based on the analysis of 15 different design and deadweight. Table D.1
presents the oil outflowparameters estimated by themodifiedmethodol-
ogy proposed in (Smailys and Česnauskis, 2006).
Table D.1
Oil outflowparameters (from cargo tanks) estimated for some tankers navigating in Baltic
Sea area (adapted from Smailys and Česnauskis, 2006).DWT5
5
4
6
9
Ta
3
4
4
8
8
1
1
1
C
1
1
2
2
3Cargo tank
arrangement
schemeDH₁,
mZ1₂,
mL₃,
mBs₄,
mds₅,
mDs₆,
m0.98
V∑₇, m3MOS₈,
m3000 6 × 2 1.0 1.1 95 16.5 6.2 8.3 5848 109.5
000 6 × 2 1.5 1.5 95 16.5 6.2 8.3 5848 65.3
0,000 6 × 2 2.0 2.0 170.2 30.9 11.7 17 46,784 936
0,000 6 × 2 2.0 2.0 203.5 36 12.2 18 70,175 1523
5,000 6 × 2 2.0 2.0 235.2 41.8 13.8 19.8 111,111 2874
50,000 6 × 2 2.0 2.0 264 48 16.8 24 175,439 533815
2
6
1
1
1
2
3
7
9
1
2₁Distance between inner and outer hulls.
₂The vertical distance from the moulded baseline to the lowest point on the cargo tank
being considered.
₃Length of cargo tanks arranged in one longitudinal line along the waterline.
₄Moulded breadth, ₅depth, ₆moulded depth.
₇Initial volumes of cargo tank.
₈Mean oil outflow from side damage.
The calculation of the oil outflow from bunker tanks is based on the
method produced in study presented in McAllister et al. (2003). This
study includes an analysis of data extracted from bunker oil spill in
US, Canadian and international waters in 15 years. Thus, collecting
around 10,500 spill incidents suffered by 21 types of cargo vessels
with different characteristics and with different bunker layouts and lo-
cations. The methodology for performing the bunker outflow calcula-
tions is mainly based on algorithms provided in the IMO MARPOL
Annex I Regulation 22 “Accidental Oil Outflow Performance”.
The simplified approach created for the applicability of the proposed
methodology in this study is restricted to the vessels with bunker
thanks that exceed 100 m3 of fuel capacity. Other four general assump-
tions are also required to apply this methodology: the ships shall be as-
sumed loaded to the partial load line draught, oil fuel tanks shall be
assumed loaded to 98% of their capacity, the nominal density of the
fuel is 1000 kg/m3, and permeability of each oil fuel tank shall be
taken as 0.99. Table D.2 presents the oil outflow parameters estimated
for the different types of vessels using the simplified methodology pro-
posed in (McAllister et al., 2003).
Table D.2
Oil outflow parameters estimated (from bunker tanks) for some cargo navigating in Baltic
Sea area (adapted from McAllister et al., 2003).DWT Vessel type MOS₈, m3nkers
7,000 Panamax 122
0,000 Panamax 122
6,000 Panamax 20
2,000 Aframax 71
5,000 Aframax 111
21,000 Suezmax 136
36,000 Suezmax 230
51,000 Suezmax 203ontainership
D1,000 Feedership 8
H5,000 Feedership 675,000 Feedership 176
9,000 Panamax 118
6,000 Panamax 286
5,000 Post-Panamax 3195able D.2 (continued)DWT Vessel type MOS₈, m3assenger
000 Cruise 12
8,000 Ro–ro 706
ulk carrier
5,000 Handysize 7
8,000 Handysize 7
1,000 Handysize 6
5,000 Panamax 151
61,000 Capesize 188G carrier
61,000 LNG 5181₈Mean oil outflow from side damage.
Considering the oil outflow parameters estimated in both studies, a
series of defined scales have been elaborated and incorporated into
the risk management model. Thus, defining the volume of potential oil
spills derived from damages to one and two cargo tanks and/or bunker
tanks in the event collision. Table D.3 presents the produced scales
(based on oil tankers and merchant vessels navigating in the GOF) for
estimating the volume of oil accidental spills in the model.
Table D.3
Scales for the calculation of the volume of oil accidental spills in the event of collision dur-
ing winter navigationVolume
in m3Volume in tonsOne tank
damageTwo tanks
damageBunker
minBunker
maxTonnage scale
for the model–12.5 n.a. (non
applicable)n.a. 37.31 93,29 37,31–98,280.8 n.a. n.a. 155.23 n.a. 155.23
5.3–71.7 487.33 974.66 487.33 535.09 487.33–535.09
09.5–122.4 487.33 974.66 817.19 913.47 817.19–913.47
36 n.a. n.a. 1014.96 n.a. 1014.97
51.6–176.7 n.a. n.a. 1131.39 1318.71 1131.39–1318.71
03.9–286.3 n.a. n.a. 1514.99 2134.47 1514.99–2134.42
19.4 n.a. n.a. 2383.68 n.a. 2383.68
06.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3824.56
36 4678.4 9356.80 n.a. n.a. 4678.40
523 5847.92 11,695.83 n.a. n.a. 5847.92
874 9259 18,518 n.a. n.a. 9259
338 14,619.92 29,239.83 n.a. n.a. 14,619.905Appendix E. The strength of the background knowledge
This section presents the assessment of the strength of the back-
ground knowledge (evidence) utilized to construct the risk manage-
ment model of winter navigation. The background knowledge is
differentiated by evidence based on data (operational and accident re-
ports and traffic statistics) and expert judgements (human factor anal-
ysis and risk exposures). Table E.1 presents the categorization of the
strength in these two types of evidence which is based on the ideas
presented in Kloprogge et al. (2011); Flage and Aven (2009) and
Goerlandt and Montewka (2015a). Table E.2 presents the assessed
strength of the evidence in each variable of the constructed model.
Table E.1
Guidelines for categorizing the strength of the background knowledge (evidence)Evidence base The following conditions are metata (DA)
igh Low number of errors in the available data
High accuracy of the methods for recording
High reliability of the data source
Much relevant data available
Low number of missing data sets
Low level of underreporting
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Lo
Ex
H
M
Lo
O
E
St
C
Sp
M
St
Tr
V
V
Lo
Tr
H
A
A
M
A
Tr
C
Ex
C
R
AThe following conditions are metedium Conditions between those characterising high and
low strength of the evidencew High number of errors in the available data
Low accuracy of the methods for recording
Low reliability of the data source
Little available data
High number of missing data sets
High level of underreportingpert judgement (EJ)
igh A lot of reliable data is available
The assertion is seen as very reasonable
There is a broad agreement among the experts
The phenomena involved are well understoodedium Conditions between those characterising high and
low strength of the evidencew Data is unreliable
The assertion is seem as unreasonable
There is a lack of consensus among the experts
The phenomena involved are not well understoodTable E.2
The strength of the evidence in the variables of the proposed risk management model of
winter navigationVariable Information source Strength of the
evidenceperational characteristics
ncounter situation Videos based on AIS data (DA)
and expert judgement (EJ)
Medium (DA);
medium (EJ)ruck vessel Traffic statistics (DA) High (DA)
ollision angle Videos based on AIS (DA) Medium (DA)
eed of collision Statistics from AIS data (DA) Medium (DA)
anoeuvring space Videos based on AIS data (DA)
and expert judgement (EJ)
Medium (DA);
medium (EJ)ruck area Definition of cargo and bunker
tanks based on ship layouts
(DA)Low (DA)affic conditions
essel size Traffic statistics (DA) High (DA)
essel type Traffic statistics (DA) High (DA)
ading conditions Traffic statistics (DA) Medium (DA)
affic direction Traffic statistics (DA) High (DA)uman factor
dequacy of the organization Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)
vailable procedures and plans Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)
MI and operational support Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)
vailable time Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)
aining and preparation Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)
ollaboration quality Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)posure to collision
ombines:
Ice conditions;
Accident data
Expert analysisIce reports (DA)
Accident reports (DA)
Expert judgement (EJ)High (DA)
Low (DA)
Medium (EJ)isk Control Options (RCOs)
nalysis of the influence from
the 13 proposed RCOs (see
Section 2.4)Expert judgement (EJ) Medium (EJ)References
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